---

Quick Definition (30–60 words)

seccomp is a Linux kernel facility that restricts the system calls a process can make, reducing the kernel attack surface. Analogy: seccomp is a safety gate that only allows known doors to be opened in a house. Formal: seccomp uses Berkeley Packet Filter rules to filter syscalls per process.

---

What is seccomp?

seccomp, short for secure computing mode, is a kernel-level feature that allows processes to restrict which system calls they can invoke. It is a pragmatic, lightweight sandbox mechanism designed to reduce the kernel attack surface by allowing only a whitelist or filter-based policy for syscalls. seccomp is not a general-purpose container security tool by itself; it is a focused syscall filter.

What it is / what it is NOT

• It is a kernel syscall filter that runs per process or thread.
• It is NOT a full isolation mechanism like namespaces or a replacement for AppArmor/SELinux.
• It is NOT primarily intended for fine-grained DAC/mandatory access control; it prevents syscall misuse.

Key properties and constraints

• Filter semantics are implemented using BPF programs attached to processes.
• Supports modes: strict mode (historical) and seccomp BPF filters (modern).
• Policies are enforced at syscall entry, can return errno, kill process, or allow.
• Policies must be loaded by the process or its parent; user namespaces affect behavior.
• Limited introspection and debugging; failure modes often manifest as process crashes or ENOSYS.

Where it fits in modern cloud/SRE workflows

• Runtime defense-in-depth for containers and microservices.
• Complementary to SELinux/AppArmor and capability bounding.
• Useful in CI pipelines to validate that code adheres to allowed syscall patterns.
• Integrated into Kubernetes as a PodSecurityPolicy/PodSecurity admission feature or by runtime OCI hooks.
• Particularly valuable for untrusted code execution paths, third-party plugins, and multi-tenant platforms.

A text-only diagram description readers can visualize

• User process starts -> kernel loads seccomp BPF filter -> process makes syscall -> kernel checks BPF rules -> if allowed syscall executes -> if disallowed action returns error or kills process -> alerts and logs produced by runtime/host.

seccomp in one sentence

seccomp is a kernel-level syscall filtering mechanism that prevents processes from making unauthorized system calls to limit the kernel attack surface.

seccomp vs related terms (TABLE REQUIRED)

ID	Term	How it differs from seccomp	Common confusion
T1	AppArmor	Kernel MAC with file path rules not syscall filtering	Confused as a replacement
T2	SELinux	Fine-grained MAC policy focused on labels not only syscalls	People expect SELinux to stop all syscall misuse
T3	Capabilities	Granular privilege removal not syscall-level filtering	Thought to be sufficient alone
T4	namespaces	Isolates resources not filtering syscalls	Assumed to prevent kernel attacks
T5	Container runtimes	Provide orchestration and tooling not kernel enforcement	Believed to provide syscall filtering by default
T6	ptrace	Debugging interface can intercept syscalls but is intrusive	Mistaken as a security control
T7	seccomp-bpf	The mechanism seccomp uses to express filters not a separate tool	Names often used interchangeably
T8	LD_PRELOAD	Userspace function interception not kernel-level filtering	Confused with syscall blocking
T9	syscall wrappers	Library-level wrappers not kernel policy	Thought to enforce syscalls globally
T10	eBPF	Generic in-kernel programmable tech used for tracing not just seccomp	Mixed up with seccomp-bpf

Row Details (only if any cell says “See details below”)

• None

---

Why does seccomp matter?

Business impact (revenue, trust, risk)

• Reduces likelihood of kernel-level exploits that can lead to data breaches and long remediation cycles.
• Helps maintain customer trust by lowering the probability of privilege escalation.
• Lowers potential regulatory and compliance fines by reducing attack surface.

Engineering impact (incident reduction, velocity)

• Prevents classes of security incidents, lowering on-call fire drills.
• Allows safer deployment of third-party or experimental services with minimal overhead.
• Speeds iteration because teams can adopt guardrails instead of heavy approvals.

SRE framing (SLIs/SLOs/error budgets/toil/on-call)

• SLOs can include “no seccomp-caused crashes in prod” during rollout windows.
• SLIs: allowed syscall rate, blocked syscall rate, seccomp-triggered process exits.
• Reduces toil by automating policy tests in CI and including seccomp in deployment gates.
• On-call reduces paging for kernel exploit incidents but may increase troubleshooting related to filtering errors.

3–5 realistic “what breaks in production” examples

• A library update changes behavior to use a new syscall; processes suddenly exit due to seccomp kills.
• An uninstrumented third-party plugin uses ptrace; seccomp blocks it and causes silent failures.
• High tail latency due to repeated blocked syscalls in a loop, causing CPU spin and OOM.
• A misapplied broad deny policy prevents logging by blocking writev, causing loss of observability.
• Failure to include epoll/clock_gettime causes an event loop to crash unexpectedly.

---

Where is seccomp used? (TABLE REQUIRED)

ID	Layer/Area	How seccomp appears	Typical telemetry	Common tools
L1	Kernel/host	Syscall filters applied to processes	audit logs and kernel dmesg	auditd runc
L2	Container runtime	Runtime loads policies for containers	runtime logs and exit codes	container runtimes
L3	Orchestration	Admission controllers inject profiles	admission and pod events	kubernetes
L4	CI/CD	Tests validate syscalls before deploy	CI test reports	CI systems
L5	Serverless	Managed platforms restrict syscalls for functions	function logs and cold start traces	serverless platforms
L6	App layer	App enforces its own filters	app logs and error returns	libraries
L7	Multi-tenant platforms	Tenant isolation via filters	tenant-level metrics and faults	platform tooling
L8	Incident response	Used to quarantine processes	incident tickets and tracebacks	forensic tools
L9	Observability	Telemetry for blocked syscalls and rates	dashboards and alerts	monitoring stacks

Row Details (only if needed)

• None

---

When should you use seccomp?

When it’s necessary

• When running untrusted code (third-party plugins, user code execution).
• When a service exposes a large, remote-facing attack surface.
• For high-security or multi-tenant platforms where kernel exploitation risk must be minimized.

When it’s optional

• Internal-only services with strict network controls and minimal privilege.
• Early development prototypes where developer velocity matters more than hardened defense.

When NOT to use / overuse it

• Do not overrestrict during early feature development without automated policy testing.
• Avoid a blanket deny-all whitelist that causes frequent production crashes and high toil.
• Do not use seccomp as the only security control; it should be layered.

Decision checklist

• If the workload runs untrusted code and impacts multi-tenancy -> enable seccomp.
• If observability depends on syscalls blocked by policy -> run policy in monitor mode first.
• If the team lacks debugging maturity -> start with curated safe profiles.

Maturity ladder: Beginner -> Intermediate -> Advanced

• Beginner: Use curated runtime profiles; deploy in monitor mode; add to CI tests.
• Intermediate: Generate policies from observed behavior; integrate with admission controllers.
• Advanced: Automated policy minimization, canary enforcement, runtime adaptive policies with ML-assisted suggestions.

---

How does seccomp work?

Components and workflow

• Policy authoring: Create a seccomp-bpf filter or JSON profile.
• Policy loading: Process or runtime loads the BPF program via prctl/seccomp syscall.
• Enforcement: Kernel executes BPF for each syscall entry.
• Action: Kernel returns errno, kills process, or allows.
• Observability: Runtime and audit subsystems generate logs and events.

Data flow and lifecycle

1. Developer authors profile or uses a curated profile.
2. Container runtime or process calls seccomp to install BPF.
3. Process runs; each syscall is evaluated by BPF program.
4. Matching rules cause allow or defined action.
5. Runtime/audit logs record blocked syscalls and process outcomes.
6. Policies are updated through CI/CD and redeployed.

Edge cases and failure modes

• Missing syscall in whitelist causing immediate process termination.
• Inlined or JITed syscalls from third-party libraries bypassing assumptions.
• Non-deterministic syscall sequences causing false positives.
• Conflicts with ptrace or other kernel features that interact with syscall flow.

Typical architecture patterns for seccomp

• Curated profile per runtime: Use vendor-provided safe profiles for common runtimes.
• Per-application tailored profiles: Generate policy from CI test runs and refine.
• Admission controller enforcement: Cluster-level policy enforcement via orchestration.
• Canary enforcement: Gradually shift from audit to enforce with canary pods.
• Adaptive learning pipeline: Use telemetry to suggest policy updates automatically.
• Multi-tenant guardrails: Shared platform policies with tenant overrides for specific containers.

Failure modes & mitigation (TABLE REQUIRED)

ID	Failure mode	Symptom	Likely cause	Mitigation	Observability signal
F1	Process killed	Container exits immediately	Missing syscall in profile	Run in audit then refine	Container exit codes
F2	Silent failure	Service returns errors with no logs	Logging syscall blocked	Allow logging syscalls temporarily	Increased error traces
F3	High CPU	Spinning on blocked syscall loop	Busy loop with rejected syscall	Add rate limiting and allow needed syscall	CPU and syscall rate
F4	Deployment rollback	Canary fails health checks	Overrestrictive policy	Canary smaller subset and iterate	Canary health metrics
F5	Debug breaks	Debug tools fail to attach	ptrace blocked by policy	Add debugging exceptions for staging	Debug attach failure logs

Row Details (only if needed)

• None

---

Key Concepts, Keywords & Terminology for seccomp

• seccomp — Kernel syscall filtering mechanism — Limits kernel exposure — Confusing with MACs.
• seccomp-bpf — BPF programs used by seccomp — Express filters efficiently — BPF complexity.
• BPF — In-kernel programmable bytecode — Enables filtering and tracing — Misunderstood capabilities.
• syscall — Kernel entry points for processes — Attack surface to reduce — Not all syscalls are needed.
• prctl — Process control syscall to load filters — Used to install seccomp — Requires privileges.
• SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER — Modern seccomp mode for BPF filters — Allows complex policies — Needs careful testing.
• SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT — Legacy strict mode — Very restrictive preset — Often too limiting.
• errno — Error number returned for blocked syscalls — Can cause upstream errors — Apps may mishandle.
• EPERM — Permission error returned by some policies — Generic failure mode — Hard to debug.
• ENOSYS — Function not implemented error — Shown when syscall unavailable — Misleading if used for filters.
• kill process action — seccomp action that kills offending process — Effective but noisy — Hard on SRE.
• return errno action — Deny but continue — Safer for graceful handling — May hide silent failures.
• audit subsystem — Kernel auditing for security events — Records blocked syscalls — Verbose and heavy.
• runtime profile — A packed seccomp policy used by runtimes — Operational baseline — Needs updates.
• curated profile — Vendor-managed safe profile — Low friction for teams — Not minimal.
• policy generation — Creating profiles from observed behavior — Practical approach — May overfit tests.
• policy minimization — Reducing allowed syscalls — Stronger security — Risk of breaking edge cases.
• admission controller — Orchestration hook to validate/inject policies — Cluster-level governance — Adds complexity.
• PodSecurityPolicy — Kubernetes mechanism to control pod capabilities — Can include seccomp rules — Deprecated in some versions.
• PodSecurity admission — Kubernetes native security admission — Injects policies — Newer replacement.
• OCI hooks — Runtime hooks to modify container behavior — Can apply seccomp on start — Integration points.
• containerd — Container runtime that supports seccomp profiles — Common in cloud environments — Requires correct config.
• runc — Reference runtime that loads seccomp filters — Often used by container engines — Profile location matters.
• AppArmor — LSM focusing on path-based policy — Complements seccomp — Different scope.
• SELinux — Label-based mandatory access control — Complex but powerful — Separate from syscall filtering.
• capabilities — Fine-grained Linux privileges — Reduce capabilities alongside seccomp — Not overlapping functionality.
• namespaces — Resource isolation primitives — Not a syscall filter — Works with seccomp.
• ptrace — Debug/tracing interface — Interacts with syscall flow — May conflict with seccomp.
• eBPF — Extended BPF for tracing and observability — Can inspect but not enforce seccomp policies — Powerful for telemetry.
• observability signal — Any metric/log/tracing relevant to seccomp — Essential for reliability — Often missing.
• canary enforcement — Gradual enforcement rollout technique — Limits blast radius — Needs good telemetry.
• audit mode — A mode where actions are logged but not enforced — Useful for policy generation — Must be monitored.
• denylist — Blocking specific syscalls — Easier but error-prone — Can miss novel attacks.
• allowlist — Whitelisting syscalls — Stronger but brittle — Recommended with testing.
• syscall sandboxing — General term for restricting system calls — Includes seccomp — Broad term.
• exploit mitigation — Actions to prevent kernel exploitation — seccomp is one layer — Part of defense-in-depth.
• forensic trace — Postmortem syscall logs — Useful for root cause — Often incomplete.
• syscall fuzzing — Testing approach to discover needed syscalls — Useful for policy generation — Time-consuming.
• game day — Controlled exercise to validate policies — Critical for safe production use — Should be automated.
• third-party plugin risk — Plugins may use unexpected syscalls — Major use case for seccomp — Requires per-plugin policy.
• function sandbox — Serverless pattern of restricting function syscalls — Common in managed PaaS — Platform-provided.
• telemetry pipeline — Delivery path for logs and metrics — Needed for monitoring seccomp — Needs retention planning.
• false positive — Legitimate behavior blocked by policy — Causes outages — Policy refinement needed.
• false negative — Malicious behavior allowed by policy — Security risk — Requires policy tightening.
• runtime validation — CI checks that validate profiles on new builds — Prevents regressions — CI integration is critical.
• policy drift — Divergence between policy and runtime behavior — Causes surprises — Needs automated checks.

---

How to Measure seccomp (Metrics, SLIs, SLOs) (TABLE REQUIRED)

ID	Metric/SLI	What it tells you	How to measure	Starting target	Gotchas
M1	blocked_syscall_rate	Frequency of blocked syscalls	Count blocked events per minute	<1% of total syscalls	Audit noise can inflate
M2	seccomp_exits	Process exits due to seccomp	Count of exit events with seccomp cause	0 per week in prod	Exits may be transient
M3	allowlist_coverage	Percent of observed syscalls covered	Observed allowed divided by total	95% on canary	Test coverage affects result
M4	policy_update_failures	Failures applying new profiles	CI/deployment failures	0 after validation	Tooling rights required
M5	seccomp_audit_volume	Size of audit logs	Log bytes per hour	Depends on retention	High cost if verbose
M6	debug_attach_failures	Failed debug attach attempts	Count per dev/test env	Low on staging	Normal in locked prod
M7	incident_count_related	Incidents due to seccomp	Postmortem categorization	0 major incidents	Tracking discipline needed
M8	blocked_syscall_latency	Latency spikes correlated with blocks	P95 latency when blocks occur	Minimal deviation	Attribution complexity

Row Details (only if needed)

• None

Best tools to measure seccomp

Tool — auditd

• What it measures for seccomp: Kernel audit events for blocked syscalls.
• Best-fit environment: Linux hosts and VMs.
• Setup outline:
• Enable syscall auditing rules for seccomp events.
• Configure log rotation and forwarding.
• Integrate with SIEM.
• Strengths:
• Kernel-level events are comprehensive.
• Long history and tooling.
• Limitations:
• Verbose and high cardinality.
• Potential performance and storage cost.

Tool — eBPF tracing (bcc/tracee-based)

• What it measures for seccomp: Real-time syscall traces and filtered events.
• Best-fit environment: High-fidelity observability on Linux hosts.
• Setup outline:
• Deploy eBPF agents with required privileges.
• Attach probes to syscall entry.
• Correlate with process metadata.
• Strengths:
• Low overhead tracing.
• Powerful correlation capabilities.
• Limitations:
• Requires kernel compatibility.
• Needs operator expertise.

Tool — Runtime logs (containerd/runc)

• What it measures for seccomp: Runtime load errors and seccomp denials logged by runtime.
• Best-fit environment: Container platforms.
• Setup outline:
• Enable and forward runtime logs.
• Parse for seccomp events.
• Add to dashboards.
• Strengths:
• Close to enforcement point.
• Useful for troubleshooting.
• Limitations:
• Format varies by runtime.
• May not include syscall-level detail.

Tool — CI policy validators

• What it measures for seccomp: Policy application and validation status.
• Best-fit environment: CI/CD pipelines.
• Setup outline:
• Add policy validation stage.
• Use test workloads to generate syscalls.
• Block merges on failures.
• Strengths:
• Prevents regressions before deployment.
• Automates verification.
• Limitations:
• Test coverage dependent.
• False security when tests are limited.

Tool — SIEM / Log analytics

• What it measures for seccomp: Aggregated blocked events and trends.
• Best-fit environment: Security operations teams.
• Setup outline:
• Ingest kernel and runtime logs.
• Create dashboards for blocked rates.
• Configure alerts for spikes.
• Strengths:
• Centralized correlation with other signals.
• Enables incident detection.
• Limitations:
• Cost and noise management.
• Requires schema consistency.

Recommended dashboards & alerts for seccomp

Executive dashboard

• Panels:
• Total blocked syscalls per week — high-level trend.
• Seccomp-related incidents — business impact.
• SLO burn rate for seccomp-induced outages — decision support.
• Why: Gives leadership a concise security posture view.

On-call dashboard

• Panels:
• Live blocked syscall rate per service.
• Recent seccomp-caused process exits.
• Canary enforcement health.
• Top offending containers/pids.
• Why: Fast triage and rollback decisions.

Debug dashboard

• Panels:
• Per-pod syscall traces timeline.
• Audit log samples with process metadata.
• Correlation of blocked syscalls with latency and errors.
• Canary vs production policy diff.
• Why: Deep troubleshooting and root cause analysis.

Alerting guidance

• What should page vs ticket:
• Page: New high-rate seccomp process exits affecting production SLOs.
• Ticket: Single-blocked syscall in non-critical staging environments.
• Burn-rate guidance:
• Treat seccomp-caused outages in SLO burn-rate rules; alert if 50% of error budget is consumed by seccomp issues.
• Noise reduction tactics:
• Deduplicate alerts by container image and reason.
• Group by service and time window.
• Suppress audit-mode spikes during policy generation windows.

---

Implementation Guide (Step-by-step)

1) Prerequisites – Kernel with seccomp-bpf support. – Runtime support (container runtime that loads profiles). – Observability pipeline to capture audit/runtime logs. – CI/CD and test harness to generate syscall coverage.

2) Instrumentation plan – Deploy audit logging in non-production. – Add eBPF probes on dev/staging for detailed traces. – Configure runtime logging to forward seccomp-related messages.

3) Data collection – Collect kernel audit and runtime logs centrally. – Tag events with container/pod metadata. – Store samples and aggregated metrics.

4) SLO design – Define acceptable blocked syscall rates. – Define allowable seccomp-exit counts per service per month. – Create error budget rules and escalation.

5) Dashboards – Build canary enforcement dashboard first. – Offer on-call and debug dashboards. – Ensure retention for postmortem analysis.

6) Alerts & routing – Page for production-critical seccomp exits. – Create tickets for audit-mode anomalies. – Route to platform security and service owner.

7) Runbooks & automation – Runbook: Steps to roll back to audit mode, capture logs, and patch policy. – Automation: CI check to block merges if policy causes test failures.

8) Validation (load/chaos/game days) – Run load tests to surface missing syscalls. – Chaos test by enabling enforce in small percentage of traffic. – Schedule game days for postmortem and lessons.

9) Continuous improvement – Automate policy refinement from production telemetry. – Regular reviews and policy minimization cycles.

Include checklists:

Pre-production checklist

• Kernel and runtime support validated.
• Audit logging configured and verified.
• CI tests generate syscall coverage.
• Team has runbook and rollback plan.
• Dashboard ingest validated.

Production readiness checklist

• Canary policies applied and health monitored.
• Retention and alerting configured.
• On-call trained on seccomp runbook.
• Policies versioned and stored in repo.

Incident checklist specific to seccomp

• Capture logs and process metadata immediately.
• Switch affected workloads to audit mode or rollback.
• Correlate blocked syscalls with deployment changes.
• Patch profile and redeploy canary.
• Update postmortem and policy repository.

---

Use Cases of seccomp

1) Multi-tenant platform isolation – Context: Shared cluster runs customer workloads. – Problem: Kernel exploits in one tenant can affect others. – Why seccomp helps: Limits syscalls tenants can use. – What to measure: Blocked syscall rate per tenant. – Typical tools: Runtime profiles, Kubernetes admission.

2) Plugin sandboxing for applications – Context: Extensible app allows third-party plugins. – Problem: Plugins can escalate privileges via unexpected syscalls. – Why seccomp helps: Restrict plugin syscall surface. – What to measure: Plugin-executed syscall set. – Typical tools: Application-level loader with per-plugin profiles.

3) Hardened microservices – Context: Internet-facing microservice. – Problem: Remote exploit path could reach kernel. – Why seccomp helps: Prevents exploit actions that need certain syscalls. – What to measure: Seccomp exit incidents across services. – Typical tools: Vendor curated profiles, CI validation.

4) Serverless function sandboxing – Context: Function-as-a-service for user code. – Problem: Arbitrary code could try privileged syscalls. – Why seccomp helps: Platform-level defense for functions. – What to measure: blocked syscalls per function type. – Typical tools: Platform-managed seccomp policies.

5) CI job isolation – Context: CI runs untrusted PRs. – Problem: Build jobs may try to escape builder. – Why seccomp helps: Limit syscall use of build containers. – What to measure: blocked events during CI runs. – Typical tools: CI hooks applying seccomp in runner.

6) Desktop app sandboxing – Context: Security-sensitive desktop app. – Problem: Plugins or scripts could call dangerous syscalls. – Why seccomp helps: Restrict behavior at process level. – What to measure: Unusual syscall attempts by plugin. – Typical tools: App loads profile at startup.

7) Forensics and incident quarantine – Context: Suspected compromised host. – Problem: Need to limit attacker actions during forensics. – Why seccomp helps: Quarantine critical processes. – What to measure: Ongoing blocked attempts during containment. – Typical tools: Manual seccomp policies installed by responders.

8) Compliance for regulated workloads – Context: Sensitive data handling service. – Problem: Regulators demand layered controls. – Why seccomp helps: Demonstrable kernel-level controls. – What to measure: Policy coverage and audit logs. – Typical tools: Policy versioning and audit retention.

9) Reducing attack surface for immutable infra – Context: Immutable microVM or unikernel environments. – Problem: Small footprint still needs syscall control. – Why seccomp helps: Minimize syscalls in constrained hosts. – What to measure: Syscall diversity and counts. – Typical tools: Minimal allowlists.

10) IoT device hardening – Context: Embedded Linux devices. – Problem: Exposed kernel can be exploited remotely. – Why seccomp helps: Restrict device processes to necessary syscalls. – What to measure: Block attempts and firmware update failures. – Typical tools: Device firmware loads profiles at boot.

---

Scenario Examples (Realistic, End-to-End)

Scenario #1 — Kubernetes pod hardening (Kubernetes scenario)

Context: A public cluster runs customer-facing services. Goal: Enforce syscall restrictions per pod with minimal disruption. Why seccomp matters here: Prevent kernel-level exploits from a compromised pod. Architecture / workflow: Admission controller injects seccomp profiles into pod spec; runtime applies at start. Step-by-step implementation:

1. Use vendor curated baseline profile for common images.
2. Deploy admission controller to add profile labels on pod creation.
3. Run audit-mode for two weeks and collect blocked events.
4. Generate refined profile per service and run canary enforcement.
5. Roll out enforcement cluster-wide with canary windows. What to measure: blocked_syscall_rate per pod, seccomp_exits, latency impact. Tools to use and why: Runtime logs for enforcement, CI validators, central logging for audit. Common pitfalls: Overrestricting logging syscalls causing loss of observability. Validation: Run load tests and canary windows; ensure no SLO violations. Outcome: Reduced kernel attack surface and improved platform security.

Scenario #2 — Serverless function platform (serverless/managed-PaaS scenario)

Context: Managed PaaS runs customer-supplied functions. Goal: Sandbox functions to prevent kernel-level abuse. Why seccomp matters here: Functions are untrusted and multi-tenant. Architecture / workflow: Platform injects minimal allowlist per runtime; audit-mode collection on new function types. Step-by-step implementation:

1. Define baseline function profile for runtime language.
2. Observe new functions in audit-mode for a period.
3. Auto-suggest profile additions based on observed behavior.
4. Enforce with gradual rollout and business rules. What to measure: function_blocked_rate, cold start latency, audit log volume. Tools to use and why: Platform-managed policies and telemetry to central dashboard. Common pitfalls: Cold start latency from heavy audit logging. Validation: Canary enforcement and function-level load tests. Outcome: Secure function execution with controlled syscall surface.

Scenario #3 — Incident response and postmortem (incident-response/postmortem scenario)

Context: A production service had unexplained crashes. Goal: Determine if seccomp caused the outage and prevent recurrence. Why seccomp matters here: Seccomp misconfiguration can cause abrupt process termination. Architecture / workflow: Collect audit logs, process traces, and recent deployments. Step-by-step implementation:

1. Triage and gather kernel audit events and runtime logs.
2. Identify process exit reason and matching seccomp rule.
3. Revert to audit-mode for affected replicas.
4. Update policy in repo and run CI validation.
5. Execute postmortem and update runbooks. What to measure: seccomp_exits and incidence per deployment. Tools to use and why: Centralized logs, CI, and canary pipelines. Common pitfalls: Missing audit logs for the time of failure. Validation: Reproduce in staging with same image and policy. Outcome: Corrected profile and improved deployment checklist.

Scenario #4 — Cost/performance trade-off in high throughput service (cost/performance trade-off scenario)

Context: High throughput service sensitive to CPU and latency. Goal: Use seccomp without degrading performance or incurring excessive logging costs. Why seccomp matters here: Security must not break performance SLOs. Architecture / workflow: Use minimal allowlists and sampling for audit logs. Step-by-step implementation:

1. Start with curated minimal profile.
2. Run performance benchmark with audit-mode and sampling.
3. Measure CPU and latency with and without enforcement.
4. Tune logging sampling rate; allow essential syscalls to avoid busy loops.
5. Monitor cost metrics for log ingestion. What to measure: blocked_syscall_latency, CPU usage, log ingestion cost. Tools to use and why: eBPF for low overhead tracing and SIEM for aggregated insights. Common pitfalls: Full audit logging causing unacceptable costs. Validation: Load tests and cost simulation. Outcome: Balanced enforcement with acceptable overhead.

Scenario #5 — Plugin sandbox for a database extension

Context: Database supports third-party extensions loaded into process. Goal: Restrict extension syscall capabilities to prevent escalation. Why seccomp matters here: Extensions run in same process and can exploit kernel interfaces. Architecture / workflow: Load extension under a separate worker process with tailored seccomp profile. Step-by-step implementation:

1. Implement extension host process.
2. Apply per-extension allowlist.
3. Monitor extension behavior in audit-mode.
4. Harden worker process and limit capabilities. What to measure: extension_blocked_events, worker process exits. Tools to use and why: Application loader and runtime logs. Common pitfalls: Extension assumes access to syscalls for legitimate tasks. Validation: Compatibility testing and extension certification. Outcome: Safer plugin execution and reduced attack risk.

---

Common Mistakes, Anti-patterns, and Troubleshooting

1) Symptom: Immediate container crashes after enabling seccomp -> Root cause: Missing allowed syscall -> Fix: Switch to audit mode and capture blocked syscalls. 2) Symptom: Logs stop appearing -> Root cause: writev/write blocked -> Fix: Add logging syscalls to allowlist during fix window. 3) Symptom: Debugging tools fail to attach -> Root cause: ptrace blocked -> Fix: Allow debug attach in staging only. 4) Symptom: High CPU after enforcement -> Root cause: Busy loop with blocked syscall -> Fix: Inspect process loop and add appropriate syscall or rate-limit. 5) Symptom: False positives in tests -> Root cause: Test harness uses unusual syscalls -> Fix: Update test profiles and re-run CI. 6) Symptom: Excessive audit log volume -> Root cause: Audit-mode on high-throughput services -> Fix: Sampling or selective audit rules. 7) Symptom: Long postmortem time -> Root cause: Missing telemetry correlation -> Fix: Enrich seccomp logs with pod/process metadata. 8) Symptom: Policy drift -> Root cause: No automated validation -> Fix: Add CI gating and periodic policy reviews. 9) Symptom: Confusion between seccomp and SELinux -> Root cause: Poor documentation -> Fix: Educate teams and document role of each control. 10) Symptom: Slow canary rollout -> Root cause: Manual updates -> Fix: Automate policy rollout with feature flags. 11) Symptom: Overrestrictive baseline -> Root cause: One-size-fits-all profile -> Fix: Use service-specific profiles. 12) Symptom: Missing kernel support -> Root cause: Old kernel without seccomp-bpf -> Fix: Upgrade kernel or use alternative controls. 13) Symptom: Observability gaps -> Root cause: No central logging for audit -> Fix: Ensure forwarding and tagging. 14) Symptom: Untracked incidents -> Root cause: No postmortem classification -> Fix: Add taxonomy for seccomp incidents. 15) Symptom: Policy regressions in deploys -> Root cause: No CI validation -> Fix: Enforce policy tests in pipeline. 16) Symptom: Excessive permissions to avoid breakage -> Root cause: Shortcut to business continuity -> Fix: Iterate with canary enforcements. 17) Symptom: Misattributed performance issues -> Root cause: Ignoring seccomp correlation -> Fix: Add panels correlating blocks with latency. 18) Symptom: Instrumentation only in prod -> Root cause: Broken audit in staging -> Fix: Enable full telemetry pipeline across environments. 19) Symptom: Vendor profile mismatch -> Root cause: Using mismatched curated profile -> Fix: Tailor profiles to images used. 20) Symptom: Lost context during incident -> Root cause: Logs without image or pod info -> Fix: Add metadata enrichment in forwarder. 21) Symptom: On-call fatigue from noisy alerts -> Root cause: No dedupe or grouping -> Fix: Deduplicate by reason and service. 22) Symptom: Security team blocked by lack of rights -> Root cause: Policy change requires owner approval -> Fix: Create clear escalation paths. 23) Symptom: CI flakiness due to syscall variance -> Root cause: Non-deterministic tests -> Fix: Harden tests and capture behavior reproducibly. 24) Symptom: Lack of testing of new kernels -> Root cause: Kernel-specific behavior not validated -> Fix: Add kernel matrices to CI.

---

Best Practices & Operating Model

Ownership and on-call

• Platform security owns baseline profiles.
• Service teams own service-specific additions.
• On-call rotation includes a security engineer for policy rollouts.

Runbooks vs playbooks

• Runbook: Step-by-step operational tasks for known issues.
• Playbook: High-level decision flow for uncertain incidents and postmortems.

Safe deployments (canary/rollback)

• Use canary enforcement across a small subset of traffic.
• Automate rollback to audit mode on SLO breach.

Toil reduction and automation

• Automate policy generation from telemetry.
• Add CI gates for policy validation.
• Automate canary orchestration and alert suppression windows.

Security basics

• Use least privilege with allowlists.
• Combine seccomp with capabilities and LSMs.
• Keep policies versioned and auditable.

Weekly/monthly routines

• Weekly: Review blocked syscall spikes and tune policies.
• Monthly: Policy minimization sprint per high-risk service.
• Quarterly: Game days and policy stress tests.

What to review in postmortems related to seccomp

• Timeline of policy changes and deployments.
• Audit logs and blocked syscall evidence.
• Whether policies were in audit or enforcement.
• Root cause and preventive actions for policy regressions.

---

Tooling & Integration Map for seccomp (TABLE REQUIRED)

ID	Category	What it does	Key integrations	Notes
I1	Container runtime	Loads profiles into containers	Orchestrators and runc	Requires profile files
I2	Orchestration	Injects and enforces policies	Admission controllers	Central governance point
I3	CI validators	Tests profiles in pipeline	CI tools and test suites	Blocks bad policies early
I4	Audit logger	Captures kernel audit events	SIEM and log analytics	Can be noisy
I5	eBPF tools	Traces syscalls and suggests policies	Observability stacks	Powerful but complex
I6	Policy managers	Version and distribute profiles	Git and deploy pipelines	Single source of truth
I7	Security operations	Alerts and correlates events	SIEM and ticketing	Investigations hub
I8	Runtime security	Runtime enforcement and monitoring	Runtimes and daemons	Immediate detection
I9	Testing harness	Generates syscall coverage	Test frameworks	Essential for CI
I10	Serverless platform	Platform-managed function profiles	FaaS runtime	Provider dependent

Row Details (only if needed)

• None

---

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the main difference between seccomp and SELinux?

seccomp filters syscalls while SELinux enforces label-based access control; they complement each other.

Can seccomp prevent all kernel exploits?

No. It reduces the attack surface but is one layer in defense-in-depth.

How do I test a seccomp profile safely?

Run the profile in audit-mode in staging and use CI tests to generate syscall coverage.

Will seccomp add noticeable latency?

Typically minimal, but high-frequency syscalls and heavy audit logging can affect performance.

Is seccomp supported in all container runtimes?

Most modern runtimes support seccomp but exact integration varies.

Can I apply seccomp to a running process?

Generally the process installs its own seccomp filter; some runtimes can set it at container start.

What happens when a syscall is blocked?

Action depends on policy: return errno, kill process, or log only in audit-mode.

How do I debug seccomp-caused crashes?

Enable audit logs, switch to audit-mode, reproduce locally, and consult runtime logs.

Should I use allowlists or deny lists?

Allowlists are safer; deny lists are easier but less secure.

Can seccomp be used in serverless environments?

Yes, many serverless platforms use seccomp as part of function sandboxing.

Are there automated tools to generate seccomp profiles?

Yes, policy generation from observed syscalls exists, but avoid blindly trusting generated policies.

How do I monitor seccomp in production?

Collect kernel audit and runtime logs, aggregate in SIEM, and build metrics dashboards.

Does seccomp replace capabilities?

No, it complements capabilities by filtering syscalls rather than removing privileges.

What kernel version is required?

Varies / depends.

Can eBPF be used for enforcement instead of seccomp?

eBPF is used for tracing and observability; seccomp is the enforcement mechanism for syscall filtering.

How do I handle third-party libraries that use obscure syscalls?

Use audit-mode to identify them and then decide whether to allow or isolate via separate process.

What common mistakes should I avoid when first rolling out seccomp?

Overrestricting without audit-mode, no CI validation, and missing telemetry.

Is there a standard seccomp profile for all languages?

No. Language runtimes differ; use curated baselines and tailor per runtime.

---

Conclusion

seccomp is a practical, kernel-level control to limit system calls and reduce the kernel attack surface. In modern cloud-native and SRE workflows it complements other layers like capabilities, namespaces, and LSMs. Adopt a measured approach: start with curated profiles, run in audit-mode, validate in CI, and roll out with canary enforcement while maintaining observability.

Next 7 days plan (5 bullets)

• Day 1: Inventory workloads and identify high-risk services for seccomp.
• Day 2: Enable audit-mode for identified services and start collecting logs.
• Day 3: Add CI policy validation stage to prevent regressions.
• Day 4: Create on-call runbook and dashboard for seccomp signals.
• Day 5–7: Run canary enforcement for a small subset and iterate on policies.

---

Appendix — seccomp Keyword Cluster (SEO)

• Primary keywords
• seccomp
• seccomp BPF
• Linux seccomp
• seccomp profile
• seccomp tutorial
• seccomp guide
• syscall filtering
• seccomp Kubernetes
• seccomp best practices

• seccomp security

• Secondary keywords

• seccomp audit mode
• seccomp allowlist
• seccomp denylist
• seccomp examples
• seccomp policies
• seccomp in containers
• seccomp profiles runc
• seccomp for serverless
• seccomp runtime

• seccomp troubleshooting

• Long-tail questions

• what is seccomp used for
• how does seccomp work
• how to create a seccomp profile
• seccomp vs selinux differences
• seccomp best practices for kubernetes
• can seccomp prevent kernel exploits
• how to debug seccomp crashes
• seccomp policy generation steps
• seccomp audit mode meaning
• how to measure seccomp impact
• seccomp and container runtimes compatibility
• should I use seccomp in production
• how to integrate seccomp into CI
• seccomp performance overhead explained
• seccomp vs apparmor differences
• how to monitor seccomp events
• seccomp use in serverless platforms
• how to write seccomp-bpf rules
• examples of seccomp policies for common services

• how to handle third-party libraries with seccomp

• Related terminology

• BPF
• eBPF
• prctl
• SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
• SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
• syscall
• auditd
• containerd
• runc
• admission controller
• PodSecurity admission
• capabilities
• namespaces
• LSM
• AppArmor
• SELinux
• SIEM
• CI validators
• policy minimization
• canary enforcement
• syscall sandboxing
• kernel audit
• process isolation
• runtime security
• telemetry pipeline
• policy drift
• false positive
• false negative
• game day
• postmortem
• forensic trace
• kernel exploit mitigation
• serverless sandbox
• multi-tenant isolation
• plugin sandboxing
• syscall fuzzing
• debug attach
• audit log sampling
• runtime profile
• curated profile
• policy manager